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Abstract In this chapter we document fiscal policy developments in the main euro 
area economies over the last two decades and highlight the dramatic changes triggered 
by the COVID-19 pandemic. We analyse how euro area yield curves respond to COVID-19 
related expectations of fiscal expansion. We show how fiscal constraints may affect inter-
est rates. Upward pressure on national yields from higher debt levels could compromise 
fiscal and financial stability in the long-term.
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Summary 1 Introduction. – 2 Fiscal Policy in the Euro Area. – 3 Interest Rate Dynamics 
Before and During the COVID-19 Crisis. – 4 Conclusion.
1 Introduction
The coronavirus pandemic has completely reshaped the current macroeco-
nomic conditions and the economic outlook. According to the European Com-
mission, euro area GDP is expected to shrink, on average, by 7.7% in 2020. 
This contraction is far deeper than what was experienced during the Great 
Financial Crisis of 2008-09. Furthermore, the average contraction rate masks 
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marked cross-country heterogeneity, with countries hardest hit by 
the recession, such as Italy, Spain and France, facing a projected 
decrease in output of 9.2%, 9.4% and 8.4%, respectively.1 Euro ar-
ea countries have tackled the crisis with an unprecedented fiscal 
response. This will increase government budget deficits by sever-
al percentage points and will heavily affect the Debt-to-GDP ratios 
over the medium term.2 
In this chapter, we show that this fiscal expansion comes at a time 
when governments face substantially different financial constraints 
across the euro area. Germany, which was the most fiscally conserva-
tive country leading up to the crisis, has plenty of financial resources 
to respond to the economic downturn. Instead, other countries, such 
as Italy and Spain, did not manage to reduce their outstanding debt 
in the last decade, which limits their ability to respond to the crisis.3 
We also analyse several euro area yield curves during the pandemic 
and explain how they may be linked, at least in part, to expectations 
of increased budget deficits.
The effects of fiscal policy on the macroeconomy and on interest 
rates have been widely studied in the past.4 One of the main econom-
ic channels linking government bond supply and interest rates is du-
ration risk, as described in Vayanos and Vila (2009). A number of 
This paper should not be reported as representing the views of the European Cen-
tral Bank. The views expressed are those of the Authors and do not necessarily re-
flect those of the ECB.




2 Examples of newspaper on expected fiscal expansions are: “Germany Tears Up Fis-
cal Rule Book to Counter Coronavirus Pandemic”. Financial Times, 21 March 2020; “It-
aly Boosts Aid Package as Europe Battles Coronavirus Outbreak”. Financial Times, 
10 March 2020; “France to Extend Crisis Jobs Scheme for Up to Two Years”. Financial 
Times, 8 June 2020.
3 This was also reported in the international press. For example: “Spain’s Tight Budg-
et Puts Squeeze on Coronavirus Response”. Financial Times, 24 June 2020.
4 For example, Corsetti et al. (2013) find that strained public finances might affect 
macroeconomic stability by a sovereign-risk channel, which raises funding costs in the 
private sector. Bonam and Lukkezen (2019) show that, when government debt is risky, 
increased deficits raise interest rates and crowd out consumption. Blanchard (2019) 
argues that in the US, as long as interest rates are below growth rates, debt rollovers 
may have no fiscal cost. Hatchondo, Roch and Martinez (2012) study how economies 
pay a significant default premium in absence of fiscal rules. Laubach (2009) estimates 
how debt and deficits affect long-term forward rates in the US. Ghosh et al. (2013) esti-
mate for several countries a debt limit, which serves as an upper threshold for govern-
ment debt that would cause a sovereign default if surpassed. Other relevant work on 
fiscal policy and interest rates is for example: Reinhart, Sack, Heaton 2000; Cimadomo, 
Claeys, Poplawski-Ribeiro 2016; Arellano et al. 2013; Bi 2012; Jaramillo, Weber 2013; 
Kumar, Baldacci 2010; Falagiarda, Gregori 2015.
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empirical papers has found a positive relationship between different 
measures of bond supply and sovereign yields.5 Other related empir-
ical work has estimated the impact of asset-purchase programmes 
(Quantitative Easing) in US and in Europe, which lowered interest 
rates by effectively decreasing bond supply in the market through 
bond purchases.6 
The chapter is structured as follows: section 2 discusses fiscal pol-
icy developments in the euro area. Section 3 illustrates yield curve 
movements before and during the pandemic period and describes 
the relationship between sovereign yields and fiscal policy. Section 
4 concludes.
2 Fiscal Policy in the Euro Area
The fiscal position of the main euro area (EA) countries has been 
quite heterogenous in the last fifteen years. In figure 1, we show how 
budget deficits and Debt-to-GDP have evolved for Italy, Spain, France 
and Germany [fig. 1]. All countries responded to the Great Financial 
Crisis with a fiscal expansion, which deteriorated budget deficits and 
increased Debt-to-GDP ratios between 2008 and 2011. The situation 
stabilised in the last few years, with Italy, Spain and France run-
ning very similar budget deficits – below 3% – from 2016 onwards. 
The most fiscally conservative country was Germany, which ran a 
budget surplus from 2013 to 2019. This surplus contributed to a sig-
nificant reduction of German Debt-to GDP which shrank by 20 per-
centage points in the last decade. France and Spain currently dis-
play very similar levels of outstanding debt, while Italy is by far the 
country showing the worst Debt-to-GDP ratio which reached about 
140% in Q4 2019.
With such a high Debt-to-GDP ratio, Italy may soon show signs of 
”fiscal fatigue” (Ghosh et al. 2013). Specifically, government debt can 
be ultimately repaid in two ways: either with a nominal GDP growth 
rate higher than nominal sovereign yields (i.e. a positive GDP growth-
interest rate differential) or by running primary surpluses that will 
compensate the interest payments on debt. However, high levels of 
debt would need a substantial primary surplus in order to cope with 
mounting interest payments and reduce the outstanding amount of 
5 See, for example, Greenwood, Vayanos 2014; Billio et al. 2020; Krishnamurthy, Viss-
ing-Jorgensen 2012; Greenwood, Hanson, Vayanos 2015. 
6 Some of the papers tackling this effect are for example: D’Amico, King 2013; Gag-
non et al. 2011; Krishnamurthy, Vissing-Jorgensen 2011; Altavilla, Carboni, Motto 2015; 
Blattner, Joyce 2016; De Santis, Holm-Hadulla 2017; Li, Wei 2013; Joslin, Priebsch, Sin-
gleton 2014; Eser et al. 2019; Lemke, Werner 2020.
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Figure 1 Time series of budget deficit and Debt-to-GDP ratios for the four main EA economies. The upper 
panel shows the time-series of budget deficit/surplus for Spain (ES), Italy (IT), France (FR) and Germany (DE) 
from January 2006 to December 2019. The bottom panel shows Debt-to-GDP ratios. Source: ECB
Figure 2 Interest rates and nominal GDP growth rates for Spain, Italy, Germany and France. The figure 
shows average nominal interest rates and year-on-year nominal GDP growth rates for the largest euro area 
economies, Spain (ES), Italy (IT), Germany (DE), France (FR). The average interest rates are calculated as the 
mean of 1,5, and 10 year zero-coupon bonds. Source: ECB
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debt.7 Fiscal fatigue materialises whenever a government’s ability of 
increasing the primary balance cannot keep up with the rising debt. 
The current low level of interest rates may attenuate this problem if it 
persists in the future and is not reversed by a surge in sovereign risk.
In figure 2 we show the relationship between interest rates and 
GDP growth for the four countries [fig. 2]. Countries that show a pos-
itive GDP-interest rate differential over time would stabilise debt 
even by not running budget surpluses, as the nominal growth rate of 
the economy would be higher than the nominal borrowing rates to fi-
nance that growth. In the figure, all countries had a negative differ-
ential during the financial crisis, while it became positive in the sub-
sequent period. However, Italy and Spain had the worst differential 
across the entire sample. The Italian differential was positive only 
for a few years around 2016 and, compounded with the high level of 
debt, suggests a problematic fiscal position for the country.
Entering into 2020, Germany had clearly the highest fiscal flex-
ibility and financial resources to face a macroeconomic downturn, 
in contrast with all the other countries that would have struggled 
to find resources in case of a deep recession. Then, in response to 
the COVID-19 pandemic, euro area countries planned a substantial 
fiscal expansion in 2020 and 2021 to counter the economic damage 
stemming from nationwide shutdowns. Market expectations of budg-
7 The Government could increase the surplus by raising taxes or by cutting non-in-
terest expenditures.
Figure 3 Budget deficit forecasts for 2020 and 2021 surveyed before and during the COVID-19 Pandemic. 
This figure shows budget deficit survey forecasts for 2020 and 2021 obtained in January 2020 and in April 2020. 
Source: Consensus Economics
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et deficits have deteriorated consistently since the start of the crisis. 
In figure 3 we show how survey forecasts for government budgets 
changed from January to April 2020 [fig. 3]. Germany is the country in 
which the forecast for current and next year budget deficit changed 
the most in absolute terms. Indeed, the country’s budget forecast 
changed from an expected surplus to a sizable deficit both in 2020 
and in 2021. Moreover, all countries’ forecasts worsened, as all euro 
area economies planned a substantial increase in government spend-
ing to boost their economies. These forecasts signal that investors 
expect sizable budget deficits going forward, which will substantial-
ly increase future Debt-to-GDP ratios. 
In figure 4 we also show the time-series of the cross-sectional vol-
atility of budget deficit survey forecasts [fig. 4]. This variable could be 
interpreted as a measure of uncertainty regarding the overall size 
of current and future fiscal policy interventions. The spike in the 
last data point (April 2020) is unprecedented and is bigger in mag-
nitude than spikes recorded during both the Great Financial Crisis 
and sovereign debt crisis. Thus, this figure really shows how uncer-
tain market participants were about the magnitude of the fiscal pol-
icy response by euro area countries to the pandemic. Indeed, neither 
the size of such programmes nor to what extent this fiscal expansion 
would have been covered by European schemes, such as the Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism or the Recovery Fund, were clear. This 
expected fiscal stimulus will then have to be financed by higher is-
suance of sovereign debt, which could put upward pressure on sov-
ereign yields, as investors might request a higher premium to ab-
sorb this higher supply of bonds. Quite likely, the impact on sovereign 
yields will vary across countries, with larger yield increases in coun-
tries with higher outstanding debt and sovereign credit risk.
3 Interest Rate Dynamics Before and During  
the COVID-19 Crisis
Sovereign bond market yields reflect current and expected macro-
economic conditions. Euro area interest rates have shown signs of 
stress during the pandemic period. Between February and May 2020, 
as shown in figure 5, the euro area GDP-weighted yield curve has de-
tached itself from the Bund and Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curves, 
which are often used as euro area reference curves [fig. 5]. The OIS 
is a benchmark risk-free rate and the Bund is the German govern-
ment bond curve. The bottom-left side of the figure shows average 
yield curves in the months preceding the COVID-19 pandemic, when 
the three curves were in a tighter range. The crisis caused a rela-
tively small shift in the level of the euro area curve across all matur-
ities. In order to put things into perspective, we compare the current 
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Figure 4 Standard deviation of budget deficit forecasts. This figure shows cross-sectional dispersions 
of budget deficit survey forecasts for annual budget surplus/deficit from 2007 to 2020. 
The forecasts are for the same year overall budget balance. Source: Consensus Economics
bond market dynamics with the market dynamics before and during 
the Sovereign Debt Crisis, as shown in the graphs at the top of fig-
ure 5. The three curves were priced almost equally in the period pre-
ceding the Sovereign Crisis. However, during the worst part of the 
downturn, when investors were unsure about the solvency of some 
peripheral countries, a shift in the level of the euro area curve sug-
gests a complete repricing across all maturities of the yield curve.
Even though the size of yield movements has been smaller during 
the COVID-19 pandemic than during the Sovereign Crisis, the trans-
mission mechanism of these higher perceived risks has had a simi-
lar impact on the level and shape of the euro area curve. In figure 6, 
we show the time-series of these three curves at the 10-year matu-
rity [fig. 6]. During the past 15 years, the 10-year euro area yield has 
been very close to the Bund and OIS 10-year rates during tranquil 
times (before the financial crisis and after the end of the Sovereign 
Crisis), while it detached in times of market stress. The bottom pan-
el of the figure shows interest rate movements for the same 10-year 
yields in the period surrounding the Pandemic. The spread between 
the euro area yield and the Bund/OIS rate increased abruptly be-
tween the end of February and mid-March, when it was unclear what 
kind of monetary policy support the European Central Bank would 
provide. Then, on March 18, 2020 the ECB announced the Pandem-
ic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP). The PEPP was announced 
as an asset purchase program worth €750 billion, to be initially un-
dertaken by the ECB until the end of 2020. After the announcement, 
yield spreads retraced back from their previous maximum.
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However, the spread between the euro area 10-year yield and the 
Bund/OIS yields remained wider than before the crisis. Estimating 
the upward pressure of a fiscal expansion on interest rates during 
the COVID-19 crisis is not an easy task. Euro area interest rates have 
probably been driven by several different factors during this peri-
od. Further, the PEPP announcement and implementation contribut-
ed to a significant reduction of euro area yields. We tackle this issue 
by employing a simple linear model, and by comparing the estimated 
yield impact of a fiscal expansion with yield spreads movements dur-
ing the period preceding the PEPP announcement. Specifically, we 
focus on the period between the start of February and March 18th. 
This is when macroeconomic and fiscal policies had their full impact 
on yields, which was softened afterwards by the ECB’s monetary pol-
icy intervention. We calculate the potential impact of a fiscal expan-
sion as follows. First, we run a linear regression model to study the 
relationship between 10-year country-level yield spreads over the 
OIS rate and expected budget deficits relative to GDP. The sample 
period ends in December 2019, so as to exclude any data points from 
the current crisis. Second, we use the estimated coefficients from 
the model and multiply them by the expected fiscal expansion due 
to the COVID-19 crisis. This is calculated as the difference between 
the budget deficit forecasts taken in April 2020 and the same fore-
casts obtained in January 2020. Figure 7 reports the results of this 
exercise in basis points [fig. 7]. The estimated impact greatly varies 
across countries. We estimate that Italy and Spain would have had 
Figure 5 Average OIS, Bund and EA yields before and during the Sovereign Crisis and the COVID-19 Pandemic. 
This figure shows average OIS, Bund and Euro Area yield curves before and during the COVID-19 Pandemic 
and the Sovereign Crisis. The Pre-crisis periods are June 2010-December 2010 for the Sovereign Crisis 
and September 2019-January 2020 for COVID-19. The crisis periods are June 2011-December 2011 for the 
Sovereign Crisis and February 2020-April 2020 for the COVID-19 Pandemic. The Euro Area yield curve is 
calculated by a GDP-weighted average of national sovereign yields. Source: Refinitiv, ECB
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the most sizable yield increases, with 160 and 90 basis points, re-
spectively. Germany and France show a much smaller impact instead, 
with magnitudes of around 40 basis points for both. The main take-
away from the exercise is that the estimated yield change would be 
non-negligible especially for peripheral countries.
How does this empirical evidence square with actual yields ob-
served in the market? As mentioned before, we want to focus on the 
period preceding the PEPP announcement to reduce the confounding 
effect of the ECB’s monetary policy on yields. We can use this pre-
announcement period as a benchmark for yield changes that would 
happen, at least partially, without a clear monetary policy support. 
Figure 8 shows 10-year country-level yield spreads over the OIS from 
February to May 2020 [fig. 8]. Countries with the highest estimated 
impact from our model also had the greatest yield movements in this 
period. Examining the period from the beginning of February to the 
18th of March, yield spreads increased by about 125 basis points for 
Italy, 75 basis points for Spain, 30 basis points for France and re-
mained unchanged for Germany. Except for Germany, the magnitudes 
are not so far off from our estimated impacts.
Indeed, German Bunds were largely unaffected by the crisis, with 
yields remaining stable during this period. So, the expected large fis-
cal expansion in Germany did not have any effect on German yields, 
which is at odds with what observed in other countries. However, 
in our model we do not control other factors that might have driv-
en yields during the pandemic, such as flight-to-safety effects. Spe-
Figure 6 Time series of the OIS, Bund and euro area average 10 year yields. The upper panel of this figure 
shows time-series of OIS, Bund and euro area yields from January 2006 to May 2020. The bottom panel shows 
the same time-series from November 2019 to May 2020. The vertical dashed line in the bottom panel indicates 
the date the ECB announced the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP). The euro area 10-year yield 
is calculated by a GDP-weighted average of national sovereign yields. Source: Refinitiv, ECB
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Figure 8 Country-level spreads over OIS between February and April 2020. 
This figure shows time-series of 10-year country-level yield over the 10-year OIS rate. Source: Refinitiv, ECB
Figure 7 Estimated impact of budget deficit shocks during the pandemic on yield spreads. This figure 
shows the estimated impact in basis points on euro area yield spreads of a shock on expected country-level 
budget deficits. The magnitudes are obtained as follows: 10-year country-level yield spreads over OIS are 
linearly projected onto expected budget deficit forecasts. Regression residuals are assumed to follow an 
AR(1) process. Further, the coefficients obtained by the regression are multiplied by a fiscal shock, which is 
calculated by looking at the difference between budget deficit forecasts obtained in December 2019 (pre-
pandemic) and in April 2020 (pandemic period). Source: ECB, Consensus Economics, Author’s calculations
cifically, the German Bund is widely considered a safe-haven asset. 
As a result its yield could experience downward pressure in times of 
high risk aversion. Thus, it is possible that the expected bond supply 
expansion by the German government was compensated by a higher 
demand for Bunds during the pandemic.
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4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we describe the fiscal adjustments made by the main 
Euro area countries following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Such countries planned a robust expansionary fiscal response af-
ter nationwide shutdowns caused a massive economic downturn. We 
consider the effect of deteriorating expectations of budget deficits on 
government bond yields during the pandemic period. From a policy-
making perspective, it is important to assess how fiscal constraints 
during expansionary fiscal interventions might affect interest rates, 
as upward pressure on national yields from higher debt might com-
promise fiscal and financial stability in the long-term.
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